Classifiers are often used to detect miscreant activities. We study how an adversary can efficiently query a classifier to elicit information that allows the adversary to evade detection at near-minimal cost. We generalize results of Lowd and Meek (2005) to convex-inducing classifiers. We present algorithms that construct undetected instances of near-minimal cost using only polynomially many queries in the dimension of the space and without reverse engineering the decision boundary.
INTRODUCTION
Machine learning is often used to filter or detect miscreant activities in a variety of applications; e.g., spam, intrusion, virus, and fraud detection. All known detection techniques have blind spots; i.e., classes of miscreant activity that fail to be detected. While learning allows the detection algorithm to adapt over time, constraints on the learning algorithm also may allow an adversary to programmatically find these vulnerabilities. We consider how an adversary can systematically discover blind spots by querying the learner to find a low cost instance that the detector does not filter. Consider a spammer who wishes to minimally modify a spam message so it is not classified as a spam. By observing the responses of the spam detector, the spammer can search for a modification while using few queries.
The problem of near optimal evasion (i.e., finding a low cost negative instance with few queries) was first posed by Lowd and Meek (2005) . We continue this line of research by generalizing it to the family of convexinducing classifiers-classifiers that partition their instance space into two sets: one of which is convex. Convex-inducing classifiers are a natural family to examine as they include linear classifiers, anomaly detection classifiers using bounded PCA (Lakhina et al., 2004) , anomaly detection algorithms that use hypersphere boundaries (Bishop, 2006) , and other more complicated bodies.
We also show that near-optimal evasion does not require reverse engineering the classifier. The algorithm of Lowd and Meek (2005) for evading linear classifiers reverse-engineers the decision boundary. Our algorithms for evading convex-inducing classifiers do not require fully estimating the classifier's boundary (which is hard in the general case; see Rademacher and Goyal, 2009) or reverse-engineering the classifier's state. Instead, we directly search for a minimal cost-evading instance. Our algorithms require only polynomial-many queries, with one algorithm solving the linear case with fewer queries than the previouslypublished reverse-engineering technique.
Related Work. Dalvi et al. (2004) uses a costsensitive game theoretic approach to patch a classifier's blind spots. They construct a modified classifier designed to detect optimally modified instances. This work is complementary to our own; we examine optimal evasion strategies while they have studied mechanisms for adapting the classifier. In this work we assume the classifier is not adapting during evasion.
A number of authors have studied evading intrusion detector systems (IDSs) (Tan et al., 2002; Wagner and Soto, 2002) . In exploring mimicry attacks these authors demonstrated that real IDSs could be fooled by modifying exploits to mimic normal behaviors. These authors used offline analysis of the IDSs to construct their modifications; by contrast, our modifications are optimized by querying the classifier.
The field of active learning also studies a form of query based optimization (Schohn and Cohn, 2000) . While both active learning and near-optimal evasion explore optimal querying strategies, the objectives for these two settings are quite different (see Section 2.3).
PROBLEM SETUP
We begin by introducing our notation and assumptions. First, we assume that instances are represented in D-dimensional Euclidean space X = R D . Each component of an instance x ∈ X is a feature which we denote as x d . We denote each coordinate vector of the form (0, . . . , 1, . . . , 0) with a 1 only at the d th feature as δ d . We assume that the feature space is known to the adversary and any point in X can be queried.
We further assume the target classifier f belongs to a family F. Any classifier f ∈ F is a mapping from X to the labels '−' and '+'; i.e., f : X → {'−', '+'}. We assume the adversary's attack will be against a fixed f so the learning method and the training data used to select f are irrelevant. We assume the adversary does not know f but does know its family F.
We assume f ∈ F is deterministic and so partitions X into a positive class X
We take the negative set to be normal instances. We assume the adversary is aware of at least one instance in each class, x − ∈ X − f and x A ∈ X + f , and can observe f (x) for any x by issuing a membership query (this last assumption does not always hold in practice, see Section 4 for a more detailed discussion).
Adversarial Cost
We assume the adversary has a notion of utility represented by a cost function A : X → R 0+ . The adversary wishes to minimize A over the negative class, X − f ; e.g., a spammer wants to send spam that will be classified as normal email ('−') rather than as spam ('+'). We assume this cost function is a distance to a positive target instance x A ∈ X + f that is most desirable to the adversary. As with Lowd and Meek, we focus on the class of weighted 1 cost functions
where 0 < c d < ∞ is the cost the adversary associates with the d th feature. The 1 -norm is a natural measure of edit distance for email spam, while larger weights can model tokens that are more costly to remove (e.g., a payload URL). We use B C x A to denote the ball centered at x A with cost no more than C. We use B C 1 (x) to refer specifically to a weighted 1 ball. Lowd and Meek (2005) define minimal adversarial cost (MAC) of a classifier f to be the value
They further define a data point to be anapproximate instance of minimal adversarial cost ( -IMAC) if it is a negative instance with cost no more than a factor (1 + ) of the MAC ; i.e., every -IMAC is a member of the set
2) The adversary's goal is to find an -IMAC instance efficiently, while issuing as few queries as possible.
Search Terminology
An -IMAC instance is multiplicatively optimal ; i.e., it is within a factor of (1 + ) of the minimal cost. We also consider additive optimality; i.e., requiring a η-IMAC to be no more than η greater than the minimal cost. The algorithms we present can achieve either criterion given initial bounds C + and C − such that
If we can determine whether an intermediate cost establishes a new upper or lower bound on MAC, then binary search strategies can iteratively reduce the t th gap between C − t and C + t . We now provide common terminology for the binary search and in Section 3 we use convexity to establish a new bound at each iteration.
In the t th iteration of an additive binary search, G
t is the additive gap between the t th bounds. The search uses a proposal step of
, a stopping criterion of G (+) t ≤ η and terminates in
steps. Binary search has the best worst-case query complexity for achieving η-additive optimality.
Binary search can be adapted for multiplicative optimality: by writing C − = 2 a and C + = 2 b , the multiplicative condition becomes a − b ≤ log 2 (1 + ), an additive optimality condition. Thus, binary search on the exponent best achieves multiplicative optimality. The multiplicative gap of the t th iteration is G
steps. Multiplicative optimality only makes sense when both C − and C + are strictly positive.
For this paper, we only address multiplicative optimality and define L = L ( * ) and G t = G ( * )
t , but note that our techniques also apply to additive optimality. Lowd and Meek (2005) introduced the problem of adversarial classifier reverse engineering (ACRE) where a family of classifiers is called ACRE -learnable if there is an efficient query-based algorithm for finding an -IMAC. In generalizing their result, we slightly alter their definition of query complexity. First, to quantify query complexity we only use the dimension D and the number of steps L required by a univariate binary search. Second, we assume the adversary only has two initial points x − ∈ X − f and x A ∈ X + f (the original setting required a third x + ∈ X + f ). Finally, our algorithms do not reverse engineer so ACRE would be a misnomer. Instead we call the overall problem Near-Optimal Evasion and replace ACRE -learnable with A family of classifiers F is -IMAC searchable under a family of cost functions A if for all f ∈ F and A ∈ A, there is an algorithm that finds x ∈ -IMAC (f , A) using polynomially many membership queries in D and L.
Near-Optimal Evasion
Reverse engineering is an expensive approach for nearoptimal evasion in the general case. Efficient querybased reverse engineering for f ∈ F is sufficient for minimizing A over the estimated negative space. However, the requirements for finding an -IMAC differ from the objectives of reverse engineering approaches such as active learning. Both use queries to reduce the size of version spaceF ⊂ F. However reverse engineering minimizes the expected number of disagreements between members ofF. In contrast, to find an -IMAC, we only need to provide a single instance x † ∈ -IMAC (f , A) for all f ∈F, while leaving the classifier largely unspecified. We present algorithms for -IMAC search on a family of classifiers that generally cannot be efficiently reverse engineered-the queries we construct necessarily elicit an -IMAC only.
EVASION OF CONVEX CLASSES
We generalize -IMAC searchability to the family of convex-inducing classifiers F convex that partition feature space X into a positive and negative class, one of which is convex. The convex-inducing classifiers include linear classifiers, one-class classifiers that predict anomalies by thresholding the log-likelihood of a log-concave (or uni-modal) density function, and quadratic classifiers of the form x Ax+b x+c ≥ 0 if A is semidefinite. The convex-inducing classifiers also include complicated families such as the set of all intersections of a countable number of halfspaces, cones, or balls.
We construct efficient algorithms for query-based optimization of the (weighted) 1 cost of Eq. (1) for convexinducing classifiers. There appears to be an asymmetry depending on whether the positive or negative class is convex. When the positive set is convex, determining whether B C 1 x A ⊂ X + f only requires querying the vertices of the ball. When the negative set is convex, determining whether B
= ∅ is difficult since the intersection need not occur at a vertex. We present an efficient algorithm for optimizing an 1 cost when X + f is convex and a polynomial random algorithm for optimizing any convex cost when X − f is convex.
The algorithms we present achieve multiplicative optimality via binary search; we use L as the number of phases required by binary search, C − = A (x − ) as an initial upper bound on the MAC and assume there is some C + > 0 that lower bounds the MAC (i.e., x A is in the interior of X + f ). This condition eliminates the degenerate case for which x A is on the boundary of X + f where MAC (f , A) = 0 and -IMAC (f , A) = ∅.
3.1
-IMAC Search for a Convex X + f
Solving the -IMAC search problem when X + f is convex is hard in the general case of convex cost A (·). We demonstrate algorithms for the (weighted) 1 cost that solve the problem as a binary search. Namely, given initial costs C + and C − that bound the MAC, our algorithm can efficiently determine whether B
f , then C becomes the new lower bound C + . Otherwise C becomes the new upper bound C − . Since our objective Eq. (2) is to obtain multiplicative optimality, our steps will be
. We now explain how we exploit the properties of the (weighted) 1 ball and convexity of X 
is in X − f (and also achieves cost C by Eq. 1).
Proof. Suppose not; then there is some x ∈ X − f such that A (x) = C and x has M ≥ 2 features that differ from x A . Let {d 1 , . . . , d M } be the differing features and let b di = sign x di − x A di be the sign of the difference between x and x A along the d i -th feature. Let A , we either establish C as a new lower or upper bound on the MAC. By performing a binary search on C we iteratively halve the multiplicative gap between our bounds until it is within a factor of 1 + . This yields an -IMAC of the form of Eq. (5).
A general form of this multiline search procedure is presented as Algorithm 3.2 which simultaneously searches along all unit-cost directions in the set W. At each step, MultiLineSearch issues at most |W| queries to determine whether B C 1 x A ⊂ X + f . Once a negative instance is found at cost C, we cease further queries at cost C since a single negative instance is sufficient to establish a lower bound. We call this policy lazy querying. Further, when an upper bound is established for a cost C, our algorithm also prunes all directions that were positive at cost C. This pruning is sound; by the convexity assumption we know that the pruned direction is positive for all costs less than our new upper bound C. Applying MultiLineSearch to the 2 · D axis-aligned directions yields an -IMAC for any (weighted) 1 cost with no more than 2 · DL queries but at least D + L queries. Thus the algorithm is O (DL).
K-step Multi-Line Search
The MultiLineSearch algorithm is 2 · D simultaneous binary searches (breadth-first). Instead we could search sequentially (depth-first) and obtain a best case
but for exactly the opposite convex bodies. We therefore propose an algorithm that mixes these strategies. At each phase, the K-step MultiLineSearch (Algorithm 3.3) chooses a single direction e and queries it for K steps to generate candidate bounds B − and B + on the MAC. The algorithm makes substantial progress without querying other directions. It then iteratively queries all remaining directions at the candidate lower bound B + . Again we use lazy querying and stop as soon as a negative instance is found. We show that for K = √ L , the algorithm achieves a delicate balance between breadth-first and depth-first approaches to attain a better worst-case complexity.
To analyze the worst case of K-step MultiLineSearch, we consider a defender that maximizes the number of queries. We refer to the querier as the adversary.
Theorem 3.4. Algorithm 3.3 will find an -IMAC with at most
Proof. During the K steps of binary search, regardless of how the defender responds, the candidate gap along e will shrink by an exponent of 2 −K ; i.e.,
The primary decision for the defender occurs when the adversary begins querying other directions than e. At iteration t, it has 2 options:
Case 1 (t ∈ C 1 ): Respond with '+' for all remaining directions. Here the bounds B + and B − are verified and thus the gap is reduced by an exponent of 2 −K .
Case 2 (t ∈ C 2 ): Choose at least 1 direction to respond with '−'. Here the defender
− ← B and x * ← x A + Be end for for all i = e ∈ W do begin Query classifier:
end while return: x * can make the gap decrease negligible but also must choose some number E t ≥ 1 of eliminated directions.
By conservatively assuming the gap only decreases in case 1, the total number of queries is bounded regardless of the order in which the cases are applied. Thus if t ∈ C 1 we have
since we need a total of L binary search steps and each case 1 iteration does K of them.
Every case 1 iteration makes exactly K + |W t | − 1 queries. The size of W t is controlled by the defender, but we can bound it by |W|. This and Eq. (7) bound the number of queries used in case 1 (Q 1 ) by
Each case 2 iteration uses exactly K + E t queries and eliminates E t ≥ 1 directions. Since a case 2 iteration eliminates at least 1 direction, |C 2 | ≤ |W| − 1 and moreover, t∈C2 E t ≤ |W| − 1 since each direction can only be eliminated once. Thus
and so the total queries used by Algorithm 3.3 is
As a consequence of Theorem 3.4, finding an -IMAC with Algorithm 3.3 for a (weighted) 1 cost requires O L + √ LD queries. Moreover, linear classifiers are a special case of convex-inducing classifiers for our K-step MultiLineSearch algorithm. Thus Kstep MultiLineSearch improves on the reverseengineering technique's O (LD) queries and applies to a broader family.
Lower Bound
Here we find lower bounds on the number of queries required by any algorithm to find an -IMAC when X + f is convex. Notably, since an -IMAC uses multiplicative optimality, we incorporate a lower bound r > 0 on the MAC into our statement. That is, in the worst-case all query algorithms for convex positive classes must submit at least max{D, L ( * ) } membership queries in order to be multiplicativeoptimal.
Proof. Suppose some query-based algorithm submits N membership queries x 1 , . . . , x N to the classifier. For the algorithm to be -optimal, these queries must constrain all consistent positive convex sets to have a common point among their -IMAC sets.
First we consider the case that N ≥ L. Then by assumption N < D. Suppose classifier f responds as
For this classifier, X + f is convex, B r x A ⊂ X + f , and
Consider an alternative classifier g that responds identically to f for x 1 , . . . , x N but has a different convex positive set X 
This strategy ensures that at each iteration G t ≥ G t−1 and since the algorithm can not terminate until G N ≤ 1 + , we have N ≥ L ( * ) from Eq. (4). As in the N ≥ L case we have constructed two convexinducing classifiers with consistent query responses but with no common -IMAC. The first classifier's positive set is the smallest cost-ball enclosing all positive queries, while the second classifier's positive set is the largest cost-ball enclosing all positive queries but no negatives. The MAC values of these sets differ by more than a factor of (1 + ) if N < L ( * ) so they have no common -IMAC.
This theorem shows that -multiplicative optimality requires Ω (D + L) queries. Hence K-step MultiLineSearch (Algorithm 3.3) has close to the optimal query complexity.
3.2
-IMAC Learning for a Convex X − f
In this section we consider minimizing a convex cost function A (we focus on weighted 1 costs in Eq. 1) when the feasible set X − f is convex. Any convex function can be efficiently minimized within a known convex set e.g., using the Ellipsoid or Interior Point methods (Boyd and Vandenberghe, 2004) . However, in our problem the convex set is only accessible through queries. We use a randomized polynomial algorithm of Bertsimas and Vempala (2004) to minimize the cost given an initial x − ∈ X − f . For any fixed cost C t we use their algorithm to determine (with high probability) whether X − f intersects with B C t x A ; i.e., whether or not C t is a new lower or upper bound on the MAC. With high probability, we find an -IMAC in no more than L repetitions using binary search.
Intersection of Convex Sets
We now outline Bertsimas and Vempala's query-based algorithm for determining whether two convex sets intersect using a randomized Ellipsoid method. In particular P is only accessible through membership queries and B provides a separating hyperplane for any point outside it. They use efficient query-based approaches to uniformly sample from P to produce sufficiently many samples such that cutting P through the centroid of these samples with a separating hyperplane from B significantly reduces the volume of P with high probability. Their algorithm thus constructs a sequence of progressively smaller feasible sets P s ⊂ P s−1 until either the algorithm finds a point in P ∩ Q or it is highly unlikely that the sets intersect.
Our problem reduces to finding the intersection between X A . Though X − f may be unbounded, we can instead use
. We also assume there is some r > 0 such that an r-ball centered at x − is contained in X − f . We now detail this IntersectSearch procedure (Algorithm 3.6).
The backbone of the algorithm is uniform sampling from a bounded convex body by means of the hitand-run random walk technique introduced by Smith (1996) (Algorithm 3.7) . Given an instance x j ∈ P s−1 , hit-and-run selects a random direction v through x j (we return to the selection of v in Section 3.2.2). Since P s−1 is a bounded convex set, the set Ω = {ω | x j + ωv ∈ P s−1 } is a bounded interval representing all points in P s−1 along direction v. Sampling ω uniformly from Ω yields the next step of the walk; x j + ωv. Under the appropriate conditions (see Section 3.2.2), hit-and-run generates a sample uniformly from the convex body after O * D 3 steps 2 (Lovász and Vempala, 2004) .
Using hit-and-run we obtain 2N samples {x j } from P s−1 and check if any satisfy A x j ≤ C t . If so, x j is in the intersection of X Algorithm 3.6. Intersect Search Find ω1 and ω2 s.t.
A so that sampling concentrates towards the intersection (if it exists)-for this we need a separating hyperplane of B To achieve efficiency, we choose a point z ∈ P s−1 so that cutting P s−1 through z with the hyperplane h z eliminates a significant fraction of P s−1 . To do so, z must be centrally located within P s−1 . We use the empirical centroid of half of the samples z = 1 N x∈R x (the other half will be used in Section 3.2.2). We cut P s−1 with the hyperplane h z through z; i.e., P s = P s−1 ∩ H z where H z is the halfspace
As shown by Bertsimas and Vempala, this cut achieves vol (P s ) ≤ 2 3 vol P s−1 with high probability if N = O * (D) and P s−1 is near-isotropic (see Section 3.2.2). Since the ratio of volumes between the initial circumscribing and inscribing balls of the feasible set is 
Sampling from a Convex Body
Until this point, we assumed the hit-and-run random walk efficiently produces uniformly random samples from any bounded convex body P accessible through membership queries. However, if the body is severely elongated, randomly selected directions will rarely align with the long axis of the body and our random walk will take small steps (relative to the long axis) and mix slowly. For the sampler to mix effectively, we need the convex body P to be near-isotropic; i.e., for any unit vector v,
bounded between 1/2 and 3/2 of vol (P).
If the body is not near-isotropic, we can rescale X with an appropriate affine transformation T. With sufficiently many samples from P we can estimate T as their empirical covariance matrix. Instead, we rescale X implicitly using a technique described by Bertsimas and Vempala (2004) . We maintain a set Q of sufficiently many uniform samples from the body P s and in hit-and-run we sample directions based on this set. Because the samples are distributed uniformly in P s , the directions we sample based on the points in Q implicitly reflect the covariance structure of P s .
We must ensure Q is a set of sufficiently many samples from P s after each cut: P s ← P s−1 ∩H z s . To do so, we resample 2N points from P s−1 using hit-and-runhalf of these, R, are used to estimate the centroid z s for the cut and the other half, S, are used to repopulate Q after the cut. Because S contains independent uniform samples from P s−1 , those in P s after the cut constitute independent uniform samples from P s (rejection sampling). By choosing N sufficiently large, we will have sufficiently many points to repopulate Q.
Finally, we also need an initial set Q of uniform samples from P 0 but we only have a single point x − ∈ X − f . The RoundingBody algorithm described by Lovász and Vempala (2003) uses O * D 4 membership queries to make the convex body near-isotropic. We use this as a preprocessing step; that is, given X − f and x − ∈ X − f we make
1 (x − ) and use the RoundingBody algorithm to produce Q = {x j ∈ P 0 } for Algorithm 3.6. Here we suggest improvements for 1 minimization using iterative IntersectSearch and present them as SetSearch in Algorithm 3.8.
First, since x
A , x − and Q are the same for every iteration of the optimization procedure, we only run the RoundingBody procedure once as a preprocessing step. The set of samples {x j ∈ P 0 } it produces are sufficient to initialize IntersectSearch at each stage of the binary search. Second, the separating hyperplane h y f for point y given by Eq. (8) is valid for all weighted 1 -balls of cost C < A (y). Thus, the final state from a successful call to IntersectSearch can be used as the starting state for the subsequent call to IntersectSearch.
CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK
The analysis of our algorithms shows that F convex is -IMAC searchable for weighted 1 costs. When the positive class is convex we give efficient techniques that outperform previous reverse-engineering approaches for linear classifiers. When the negative class is convex, we apply a randomized Ellipsoid method to achieve efficient -IMAC search. If the adversary is unaware of which set is convex, they can trivially run both searches to discover an -IMAC with a combined polynomial query complexity.
Exploring near-optimal evasion is important for understanding how an adversary may circumvent learners in security-sensitive settings. As described here, our algorithms may not always directly apply in practice since various real-world obstacles persist. Queries may be only partially observable or noisy and the feature set may be only partially known. Moreover, an adversary may not be able to query all x ∈ X . Queries must be objects (such as email) that are mapped into X . A real-world adversary must invert the featuremapping-a generally difficult task. These limitations necessitate further research on the impact of partial observability and approximate querying on -IMAC search, and to design more secure filters. Broader open problems include: is -IMAC search possible on other classes of learners such as SVMs (linear in a large possibly infinite feature space)? Is -IMAC search feasible against an online learner that adapts as it is queried? Can learners be made resilient to these threats and how does this impact learning performance?
